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NOTE
A CHOICE APPROACH TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF TERM LIMITATION LAWS
INTRODUCTION

Whatever else they signify, elections are about choice. Ross
Perot's electronic town halls notwithstanding, there is little doubt
that the Constitution institutes voting as the primary means by
which citizens choose their government. Additionally, the electoral
process is the overriding concern of most of the post-Bill of Rights
constitutional amendments' and of a large body of constitutional
case law.
As states continue to pass laws limiting the terms of their congressional representatives, 2 the issue of voter choice is at the fore
again. 3 Many commentators have attempted to show that term limitations promote values essential to constitutional democracy. 4 This
Note suggests that as interesting as such arguments are as a matter
of policy, 5 they miss the constitutional point. Though variants of
1
Eleven of the sixteen post-Bill of Rights amendments deal expressly with voting
or elections.
2 In the November 1992 general elections, term limitation initiatives passed in Arizona, Arkansas, California, Florida, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, and Wyoming. Robert Reinhold, Move
to Limit Terms Gathers Steam After Winning in 14 States, N.Y. TIMES, November 5, 1992, at
B8.
S
For a summary of the recent history of the term limitation movement, seeJoshua
Levy, Note, Can They Throw the Bums Out? The Constitutionalityof State-Imposed Congressional
Term Limits, 80 GEO. L. REV. 1913, 1915-20 (1992).
4 See, e.g., F. Paul Calamita, Solving the Voters' Dilemma: The Casefor Legislative TermLimitation, 8 J.L. & POL. 559, 561 (1992) (arguing that term limitations "will further the
goals of our representative democracy as envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution"); Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of the
Constitutionalityof State-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 341 (1991) (defending the constitutionality of a modified term limitation proposal); Cleta D. Mitchell, Limiting CongressionalTerms: A Return to FundamentalDemocracy, 7J.L. & PoL. 733 (1991);James
C. Otteson, A ConstitutionalAnalysis of Congressional Term Limits: Improving Representative
Legislation Under the Constitution, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3 (1991) (arguing that "elimination
of the reelection incentive will improve representative legislation"). But see Steven R.
Greenberger, Democracy and CongressionalTenure, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 37 (1991) (responding to James C. Otteson, supra, that term limitations will upset the balance of power); cf.
Linda Cohen & Matthew Spitzer, Term Limits, 80 GEO. LJ. 477, 496-510 (1992) (using
game theory to show that term limits encourage legislators to consider their own and
special interests at the expense of constituent interests).
5 For a summary of the policy arguments for and against term limitations, see Martin E. Latz, The Constitutionality of State-PassedCongressionalTerm Limits, 25 AKRON L. REV.
155, 156-62 (1991).
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the concept of representation abounded at the time of the Constitutional Convention of 1789, the Constitution itself does not require a
choice between these particular views. Instead, the Constitution
mandates only that citizens be allowed to choose their representatives with as few infringements as possible.
Consequently, courts examining the constitutionality of congressional 6 term limitations should frame the issue in terms of voter
choice. This Note argues that when examined in the light of the
Framers' social contract theory, the Constitution requires the maximum amount of substantive voter choice. Because term limitations
diminish the substantive range of voter choice by excluding the class
of incumbents, courts should hold such laws unconstitutional.7 Today's voters may not constitutionally choose to limit the substance
8
of their future choices.
Part I of this Note demonstrates that substantive voter choice is
rooted in the democratic political theory of the Framers and shows
how the Constitution institutes choice through legislative elections.
Part II argues that the Constitution harmonizes with this theory by
explicitly articulating the limited qualifications for representatives.
This reading finds support in the case law interpreting the Qualifications Clauses. 9 These cases hold that while state legislatures and
Congress may regulate the procedure of congressional elections, they
may not impose additional substantive qualifications on legislative
candidates. Part II reasons that because term limitations are substantive qualifications on electoral candidates, they are presumptively unconstitutional. This Note concludes that if voters want to
proscribe future electoral choices, they must use the mechanism that
6 This Note considers only laws and amendments that limit the terms of U.S. Representatives and Senators. Courts have consistently held that the U.S. Constitution does
not bar a state from limiting the terms of its state and local elected officials. See, e.g.,
Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1976) (holding that West Virginia state
constitutional amendment limiting governor to two terms does not violate U.S. Constitution); Legislature of State of Cal. v. March Fong Eu, 816 P.2d 1309 (Cal. 1991) (holding that California state constitutional amendment limiting the terms of state legislators
does not violate U.S. Constitution). Whether these local term limitations violate a particular state constitution is, of course, within the sole authority of the state. For a discussion of term limitations of state officeholders, see Tiffanie Kovacevich, Note,
Constitutionalityof Term Limitations: Can States Limit the Terms of Members of Congress?, 23 PAc.
L.J. 1677, 1684-97 (1992).
7 See Erik H. Corwin, Note, Limits on Legislative Terms: Legal and Policy Implications, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 569, 578 (1991) (concluding that the Qualifications Clauses of the
Constitution prohibit states from imposing term limitations).
8 Of course, voters can choose to amend the Constitution to proscribe their future
choice. But this involves a different species of choice. See infra part II.D.
9 The Qualifications Clauses are found at Article I, § 2, cl. 2 (qualifications for the
House of Representatives) and Article I, § 3, cl. 3 (qualifications for the Senate) of the
U.S. Constitution.
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the Constitution provides for structural changes: the amendment
process of Article V.10
I
SUBSTANTIVE ELECTORAL CHOICE AND THE LOCKEAN
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION

Section A of this Part explicates John Locke's social contract
theory that consent (i.e., choice) legitimates democratic government.
This Section posits that the constitutional value of choice derives
from or at least is congruent with Lockean theory. Section B argues
that the Lockean conception of consent is expressed in the electoral
system of American constitutional democracy. Section C concludes
that, in order for elections to fulfill their Lockean role of legitimating government, courts should read the Constitution to ensure the
maximum amount of substantive voter choice.
A.

The Theoretical Roots Of Choice: John Locke and the Role
of Consent in Ensuring Governmental Legitimacy
1. The Elements of Locke's Social Contract Theory

"[T]he legitimacy of the United States government-that is, its
rule by right rather than by force-rests on the consent of the governed." 1 1 John Locke is often associated with this linking of legitimacy and consent. He articulates this social contract theory in his
12
Second Treatise of Government.
Locke begins by positing humans in a pre-political "state of nature." 13 Persons in the state of nature have "perfect Freedom to order
their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they
think fit.' 4 Because the state of nature is "a State also of Equality,
wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having
more than another .... Creatures of the same species . . .should
10 See Brendan Barnicle, Comment, ConstitutionalTerm Limits: Unconstitutionalby Initiative, 67 WASH. L. REV. 415, 435-36 (1992) (arguing that because term limitations are
unsupported by the original intent of the Framers, they may only be enacted by a constitutional amendment).
1
James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing PopularSovereignty
Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 189, 192 (1990).
12 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 198.
13 Id. §§ 4-15. "The Law of Nature," i.e., natural law, establishes the conditions of
persons in Locke's state of nature. Id. § 6. The Law of Nature is synonymous with the
Law of Reason, and reason is the key to discovering the particulars of natural law. Id
Reason is available to all "who will but consult it." Id. § 4. In other words, reason is a
natural attribute of individuals. Persons in the state of nature have "perfect Freedom to
order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit." Id.
This represents the individual's natural liberty. Persons have equivalent natural rights:
no one has a right to more liberty than is consistent with another's. Id.
14 Id. §4.
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also be equal one amongst another without Subordination or Sub-

jection .....

15

It follows that in this pre-political condition no per-

son has the moral right to subordinate another.
A government, which subordinates an entire group of free individuals, must therefore justify its exercise of power over these persons in order to claim moral legitimacy.' 6 According to Locke, the
sole principle that justifies a government's power is consent: "[t]he
only way whereby any one devests himself of his Natural Liberty,
and puts on the bonds of Civil Society is by agreeing with other Men to
joyn and unite into a Community."' 17 Political theorists often describe this agreement using the metaphor of a social contract. Like
a contract for the sale of goods, both parties must manifest consent
to the social contract, and each party can exercise only the rights
specified in its terms.1 8 Just as a defect in consent vitiates a sales
contract, a defect in the people's consent to the social contract undermines the legitimacy of the government.

15
16
17

Id

Id § 199.

Id § 95. Consent can be hypothetical or actual. If Locke means merely that
persons need only hypothetically consent to government, consent will have little bearing
on real-world elections and term limitation laws. John Rawls' liberal theory ofjustice,
which he calls "justice as fairness," provides an example of hypothetical consent. See
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971). Rawls' version of the state of nature, the
original position, "is not... thought of as an actual historical state of affairs... It is
understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain
conception ofjustice." Id at 12 (footnote omitted).
When considering what the particulars of a system of government would be under
Rawls' theory, an analyst can step into the original position at any time, and use it to
determine principles of justice. Therefore, "the consent conjured up in the original
position can be purely hypothetical." Jerry Weinberger, Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and
the Rediscovery of the State of Nature, in THE REVIVAL OF CONSTrrTrxoNAusM 24 (James W.
Muller ed., 1988). For Rawls, a government is legitimate if a hypothetical individual in
the original position would rationally consent to it. Governmental legitimacy does not
depend upon a real individual's actual consent. RAWLS, supra, at 136-42.
For Locke, though, a real individual must actually (or tacitly) consent to government for the government to have legitimate power over that individual: ".... all Men are
naturally in [the state of nature], and remain so, till by their own Consents they make
themselves Members of some Politick Society." LocKE, supra note 12, § 15. This follows
from Locke's conception of the natural rights of persons. A person has no natural right
to dominate another, but she does have the right to make compacts. Id §§ 4, 95. The
only way a government (i.e., a group of persons) can exercise power consistent with
respecting an individual's rights is with the individual's consent. No person has the right
to consent for another, and therefore the consent must be actual. See Weinberger, supra,
at 1. Only a consented-to government can legitimately subordinate free individuals.
18
For an interesting discussion of the relationship between the social contract and
the sales contract in the work of Lon L. Fuller, see generally James Boyle, Legal Realism
and the Social Contract: Fuller's PublicJurisprudenceof Form, PrivateJurisprudenceof Substance,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 371 (1993).
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The Lockean Constitution19

This Note adopts James A. Gardner's conclusion that
"whatever else it may encompass, the Constitution reflects a theory
of popular sovereignty in which governmental legitimacy is based
on the consent of the governed... [and] this theory is essentially
Lockean." 20 Professor Gardner observes that recently some histori21
ans have reexamined the intellectual influences upon the Framers.
There is little debate, however, about the proposition that Locke's
ideas were in the Zeitgeist during the American Revolution and at
the time of the drafting of the United States Constitution. 22 The
writings of the Framers-including Thomas Jefferson, John Jay, 23
James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and James Wilson-all evince
24
the elements of a Lockean theory of consent.
Regardless, the argument of this Note does not turn upon the
details of the debate among intellectual historians about which philosophical strains were preeminent influences upon the Framers.
Courts, not historians, decide cases and this Note demonstrates that
the case law interpreting the Qualifications Clauses displays a
predominantly Lockean value of choice. 25

This phrase comes from Gardner, supra note 11.
Id. at 200. Gardner argues that we should read the Constitution as embodying a
Lockean theory of election laws. For Gardner, elections are important because they
"play a significant role both in implementing popular sovereignty and in mediating governmental legitimacy by enhancing electoral accuracy." Id. at 192.
21 Id. at 193-95. Gardner explains that
[t]here has been an explosion of scholarly rethinking of the ideological
origins of the Revolution and its two main documents, the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution. Historians and philosophers have
identified a wide variety of significant influences on the revolutionary
generation that are said to stand independently alongside, or contradict
entirely, the ideas of Locke.
Id at 193. The historical question of what ideas influenced a particular event is unsolvable. This is especially true when the event involves many diverse individuals, as did the
framing of the Constitution. Whether Lockean ideas directly influenced the Framers is
not essential for the argument of this Note, however. With Gardner, this Note argues
only that the Constitution reflects the outlines of Locke's consent theory.
22 See, e.g., CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 27-28 (1922). Gard19

20

ner observes that "[tihe historical record brims with evidence that the framers embraced
an essentially Lockean theory of popular sovereignty." Gardner, supra note 11, at 209.
23 Jefferson and Jay were not among the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1789, see 1787: DRAFTNG THE CONsTrrUTION 21-25 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed.,
1986) [hereinafter DRAF-rNG THE U.S. CONsTrruION] (Jay was appointed a delegate but
declined to serve, while Jefferson was in Europe at the time), but the writings of both
men were important influences upon the delegates.
24 See Gardner, supra note 11, at 209.

Id. at 193.
25

See infra part II.A.
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Elections Are the Means By Which Citizens Consent to
Government
1. Elections as a Present-Day Manifestation of Choice

The real-world equivalent of the Lockean idea of consent is the
value of choice expressed in the Constitution's provisions dealing
with elections and representation. Most people intuitively connect
consent and the election of representatives, 2 6 but this linkage also
has an important theoretical role in the Lockean social contract. According to Locke, the people's choice of a form of government is
itself a sovereign act. 27 The ratification of the Constitution is a perspicuous example of such an act: the citizens of the confederated
states formed the United States by electing state convention delegates to approve or disapprove of the proposed Constitution. 28 The
link between consent and adoption of a government is particularly
clear because the choice to form the United States was a discrete
event-the product not of evolution but of revolution. Citizens 2 9
could choose whether or not to adopt the, proposed new form of
government embodied in the Constitution; ratification was not a
foregone conclusion. 0 Thus, the adoption of the United States
Constitution was an act of electoral choice rather than a mere acquiescence to or grudging acceptance of an already existing
government.
While the ratification of the Constitution represents a choice by
an historical group of citizens, obviously no one alive today participated in that choice. Yet a citizen's sovereignty and her associated
right to consent to government is not vitiated merely because she
was not present at the founding of the government.3 1 Contemporary citizens can still consent to an existing government, albeit in a
different sense than if they were choosing an entirely new system.
26

27
28
29

See Gardner, supra note 11, at 213.
See LOCKE, supra note 12, § 132.

See

CHARLES WARREN, THE MAMNG OF THE CONSTITrrION

606-30 (1928).

The question of who was allowed citizenship at the time of the framing, and thus
who could choose a form of government, is problematic for this discussion of consent.
Tribe suggests that the Constitution may only represent the consent of white property
owners. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 10 n.2 (2d. ed. 1988); see
also Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can OriginalistInterpretation BeJustified?, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1482 (1985) (arguing that because the Framers represented only a limited socio-economic group, their intent is not an authoritative source
for interpreting the modern meaning of the Constitution). This Note considers whether
elections in general actually represent voter choice infra notes 37-54 and accompanying
text.
30 Many noted Anti-Federalists, including Eldbridge Gerry and Richard Henry Lee,
opposed the new government. See generally WARREN, supra note 28, at 733-80 (discussing
opposition to and ratification of the Constitution).
31 See LOCKE, supra note 12, § 4.
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In a republic,3 2 an individual usually exercises her consent to an existing government by choosing representatives to serve in that government.3 3 These legislators act as the agents of citizens when
making substantive governmental policies.3 4 Though citizens retain
their power to dissolve their government,3 5 they ordinarily choose

36
not to do so.

2.

Term Limitations and the Reality of Electoral Choice

Critics have challenged whether elections in the political world
truly represent voter choice. 37 These challenges take two basic
forms. First, some argue that the menu of candidates in the United
States is too limited to allow citizens a meaningful substantive
choice. Because the candidates for a legislative seat often represent
essentially the same political perspective, the argument goes, a voter
cannot really choose the government.3 8 Rather, she is just choosing
between different spokespersons for the same ideas.3 9 In the second challenge, critics argue that voters themselves are incapable or
unwilling to exercise a meaningful choice because they are apathetic,
ignorant, or alienated. 40 Instead, special interest groups herd the
electorate like so many sheep to the polls, where voters blindly mark
ballots without making a genuine political choice.41 On either arguA Lockean government need not be a republic. See LOCKE, supra note 12, § 132.
32
But Gardner notes that "the United States is a republic, not a democracy, in which the
people exercise only sovereign power and government power is exercised solely by their
representatives." See Gardner, supra note 11, at 217 n. 114 (citing THE FEDERALIST No.
63, at 387 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
33
See RUTH W. GRANT, JOHN LocKE'S LIBERAUSM 201 (1987).
34
See LOCKE, supra note 12, § 141.
35
See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
36 Electing legislators is a more attenuated exercise of sovereignty than choosing a
new form of government. See Gardner, supra note 11, at 218. Even if the electorate
chooses a legislative candidate who represents a radical departure from the status quo,
the election of a single representative may not produce the wholesale changes that approval of a new form of government would. Nevertheless, electing legislators is still an
act of sovereign consent because the voter authorizes the representative to exercise her
right of choice as her agent. Id. at 219. In a republic, then, an individual retains her
sovereign power to change the form of government if necessary. See GRANT, supra note
33, at 201. Usually, however, the individual only exercises a more limited form of her
sovereign right of choice by choosing a representative to be her agent in the existing
government. See Gardner, supra note 11, at 216.
37 See, e.g., JOHN C. LIVINGSTON & ROBERT G. THOMPSON, THE CONSENT OF THE
GOVERNED 208-40 (1963); Otteson, supra note 4, at 32 n.159.
38 Cf Richard Rose, Is Choice Enough? Elections and PoliticalAuthority, in ELECTIONS
WITHOUT CHOICE 196 (Guy Herment et al., eds., 1978) (discussing elections in which all
candidates are selected by the government).
39 Cf Marshall Frady, Outsider: I-The Gift, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 3., 1992, at 36
(describing Jesse Jackson's characterization of the American bipartisan system as "one
party with 'two names' ").
40 See LIVINGSTON & THOMPSON, supra note 37, at 210.

41

Id at 220-22.
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ment, elections do not promote real choice but instead serve some
other, presumably less valid, function.
Opponents of these critics rejoin that "the responsive voter evidences considerable awareness of ideology and issues." 4 2 Far from
having no desire or ability to make a meaningful choice, a voter can
be "moved by concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive personality." 43 Finally, these commentators observe that even conceding the
limits of choice, United States voters come closer to exercising ac44
tual consent than any other voters world-wide.

These criticisms of the reality of elections as choice are important and powerful. If voters do not truly exercise meaningful choice

in elections, governmental legitimacy may be lessened. 45 There are
at least three reasons, however, why the arguments that elections do
not truly promote choice are inapposite to this Note's concern with

the constitutionality of term limitations. First, it is fairly uncontroversial that voters exercise at least some meaningful choice when
electing representatives. 4 6 As noted above, the dispute concerns
how much choice voters have and how meaningful that choice is.
42

GERALD M. POMPER, VOTER'S CHOICE 10 (1975).

43 V. 0. KEY, JR., THE RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE 7-8 (1966).
44 Cf Alex Pravda, Elections in Communist Party States, in ELECTIONS WITHOUT CHOICE
169-95 passim (Guy Herment et al., eds., 1978) (describing the limited choices in (then)
authoritarian communist states).
45 Factors other than choice affect government legitimacy. For instance, Richard
Rose argues that:
[e]lectoral choice is not the only political institution of value ... it is
important to emphasize the conditions and limit of electoral choice.
These are usually taken for granted in Western countries, where classical
elections and fully legitimate governments are found together ....

Free

elections follow, rather than precede, the establishment of legitimate
authority.
Rose, supra note 38, at 196, 211.
46

Cf GERALD C. WRIGHT, JR., ELECTORAL CHOICE IN ELECTIONS: IMAGE, PARTY, AND

INCUMBENCY IN STATE AND NATIONAL ELECTIONS 72-75 (1974) (analyzing the 1968 Cali-

fornia senatorial election in which voters chose between an arch-conservative Republican and a liberal Democrat based both on personal image differences and substantive
policy differences).
Though observers of the presidential elections of 1992 will differ, one can plausibly
argue that the three major candidates presented voters with some meaningful range of
choice. The Democratic and Republican candidates were separated at the very least by
different stated positions on social issues such as abortion, gays in the military, and fetal
tissue research. Robin Toner, At Dawn of New Politics, Challengesfor Both Parties, N.Y.
TIMES, November 5, 1992, at BI. The independent Ross Perot ran as a Washington
outsider, and emphasized the budget deficit as the most pressing problem facing the
United States. See Stephen A. Holmes, An Eccentric but No Joke, N.Y. TIMES, November 5,
1992, at Al, B4.
Concededly, the major candidates for most elections in this country do not represent the range of political viewpoints voiced by candidates in countries such as Germany
or Great Britain. This may be due to the possibility that Americans are perhaps more
politically homogeneous than citizens of these countries.
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Though reasonable minds differ on this issue, 47 only the most cynical observers claim that the election process is an utter sham. The
existence of some quantum of electoral choice suggests that the
constitutional value of choice is at least relevant to real-world
politics.
Second, it is unclear that term limitations would increase the
aggregate amount of choice available to voters. Though term limitations supporters argue that these laws would increase substantive
choice, 48 this claim is highly speculative. Term limitations alone will
not prevent the party and special interests that helped elect an incumbent in the first place from doing the same with a replacement
candidate. 4 9 For example, the term limitation that kept George
Wallace from running for additional terms as Governor of Alabama
did not prevent voters from electing Lurleen Wallace in his stead. 50
Third, term limitations do not guarantee that voters would
choose candidates who would be any substantial improvement over
term-limited incumbents because "the same public that votes to
throw out the old Congress would elect the new one." 5 1 Even if a
term limitation gives voters more choice (and it is not clear that it
does), such a law cannot ensure that the electorate will actually exercise its vote more effectively.
Moreover, even if term limitations do increase choice in one
sense, this must be netted against the corresponding and certain decrease in choice in another sense. This is the "baby and the bath
water" problem. 52 In a system without term limitations, voters may
choose either to retain effective incumbents or to vote them out. In
a system with term limitations, voters are prohibited from choosing
an effective candidate simply because she is an incumbent. Initially,
it is at least highly questionable that term limitations will result in an
aggregate increase in voter choice.
Finally, even if electoral choice is as unrealistic as some claim,
this argument does not squarely refute the central claim of this
Note, which is that term limitations are impermissible substantive
limitations on voter choice. This Section has developed the background of the constitutional value of voter choice as an analytic tool
47
48

Compare text accompanying notes 37-41 with text accompanying notes 42-44.
See Tom Wicker, A Necessary Change?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1991, at § 4,p. 15.

49
50

Id.

See WILLIAM MANCHESTER, 2 THE GLORY AND THE DREAM 1270 (1973). Lurleen
Wallace was married to George Wallace. She ran and was elected governor with the
understanding that George would be the de facto governor. Id. The author thanks Joe
Kennedy for research assistance on this point.
51 Wicker, supra note 48, § 4, p. 15.
52 Id.
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for examining the constitutionality of term limitations. 53 This value
runs through the Constitution and provides a rationale for why the
Constitution prohibits term limitations. 54
C.

The Value of Choice Dictates Ensuring Maximum
Substantive Voter Choice

Because it is a tenet both of American political orthodoxy55 and
of Lockean theory56 that the citizenry is the ultimate sovereign, the
value of choice implies that they should have the maximum substantive choice possible. Elections, which authorize representatives to
exercise power, are the principal way by which the people exercise
their sovereignty. 5 7 Because sovereignty means complete and
supreme authority, 58 when a voter's choice of a representative is diminished, her sovereignty is reduced as well. In the political realm,
this means that a voter should be able not just to select a representative from among a slate of government-approved candidates, but to
vote for the particular person she wants.
Studies of elections in authoritarian states support this proposition. These studies suggest that elections in which voters select a
candidate from a government-approved list produce "representatives" who are not responsive to their constituents. 59 Elections that
limit substantive choice thus serve their legitimizing function more
poorly than do elections offering greater substantive choice. If a
voter's preferred candidate cannot run because of a substantive prohibition on her candidacy, the connection between choice and con60
sent is diminished.
Completely unrestrained choice, however, poses enormous
practical difficulties. For example, a presidential general election
with a thousand candidates could provide too much choice. Voters
might split into the factions that Madison warned against, 6 1 and no
See infra part II.
See infra part II.B.
55 One need look no farther than the Preamble to the Constitution: "We the People
of the United States ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America." U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
56 See LOCKE, supra note 12, § 132.
57 Gardner, supra note 11, at 213-14.
53
54

58

See

BLAcK's LAW DICTxoNARY

1395 (6th ed. 1990).

59

See Pravda, supra note 44, at 193.
60
Guy Hermet, Richard Rose, and Alain Rouqui6 note that "[e]lections are held in
nearly every country in the world... But most of these contests are elections without
choice; only about one-third of United Nations members can claim to hold competitive
free elections conforming to the classical liberal model of democracy." Guy HERMET ET
AL., Preface, in ELECTIONS WrroT
61 See THE FEDERALIST No.

CHOICE, supra note 44, at vii.
10 (James Madison).
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candidate could obtain enough support to govern effectively. 6 2 Additionally, the practical difficulties of running such an election fairly
might prove intractable. Mechanisms such as nominating systems
and primaries are practical necessities for effective representation to
exist. This is so even though these devices may marginally restrict
63
the substantive choice of voters.
Distinguishing between procedural and substantive restrictions
on voter choice if often difficult.64 The common requirement that
candidates win a primary election in order to be able to run in the
general election may affect voter choice in the same way and to the
same degree as do purely substantive restrictions. 65 Nevertheless,
Part II shows that the distinction between procedure and substance
66
exists both in the text of the Constitution and in the case law.
II
SUBSTANTIVE VOTER CHOICE IN THE CONSTITUTION:
ARGUMENTS FROM STRUCTURE AND CASE LAW

The Constitution does not explicitly set out what type of choice
voters should have. Section A of this Part demonstrates that the
thread of substantive voter choice runs through the Qualifications
Clauses and the case law interpreting them. Section B shows that
this case law preserves a distinction between substance and procedure, permitting Congress and the states to regulate only the procedure of elections. Because term limitations are substantive
regulations, courts should hold them unconstitutional. Section C
discusses some alternatives to term limitation laws which do not im62 Richard Rose makes an analogous point regarding parliamentary democracy,
noting that
UWust as subjects of a one-party state can complain of too little choice, so
citizens of [a parliamentary democracy] may complain of too much
choice, when they learn that their collective ballots have returned ten to
fourteen parties to their national parliaments. Multi-party competition
carried to this extreme is alleged to produce weak government through a
coalition of parties so numerous that they can have few positive policies
or goals in common.
Rose, supra note 38, at 196.
63 Article I, § 4 of the Constitution provides for procedural regulation of elections:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
64 See Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949) (observing the difficulty in "laying down a precise rule to distinguish 'substance' from 'procedure' ").
65 See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (noting that an election
regulation which governs "the selection and eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself," affects the individual's right to vote).
66 See infra notes 67-102 and accompanying text.
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permissibly limit substantive voter choice. This Section notes that
these alternatives, while permissible, may not adequately address
the problem of an entrenched Congress. Section D concludes that if
voters truly want to override the value of substantive voter choice,
they can do so only by constitutional amendment.
A.

The Constitution Exhibits the Value of Substantive Voter
Choice

This Section examines the Qualifications Clauses and argues
that they represent only minimal procedural regulations on voter
choice. The Supreme Court has drawn upon political theory and
the history of these clauses to suggest that Congress and the states
may not circumscribe voter choice by superadding qualifications for
candidates for Congress.
1. ConstitutionalQualifications For Congress
a. The Text of the Qualifications Clauses
The Qualifications Clauses of Article I of the U.S. Constitution
establish the standards of eligibility for members of the U.S. House
of Representatives and the Senate:
[Qualifications for members of the House] No person shall
be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of
twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that
67
State in which he shall be chosen.
[Qualifications for members of the Senate] No person shall
be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty
Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and
who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for
68
which he shall be chosen.

67
68

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, d. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c. 3.
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The age, citizenship, and residency qualifications are the "standing
qualifications." 69 Commentators 70 and courts 71 have suggested that
other provisions of the Constitution represent additional qualifications, but the Supreme Court has never so held.
Many early commentators on the Constitution maintained that
the Article I standing qualifications are the exclusive qualifications
for membership in Congress. 72 No less an authority than Hamilton
said that "[t]he qualifications of the persons who may... be chosen
[for Congress] ...are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are
unalterable by the legislature. ' 73 Early congressional practice confirmed Hamilton's reading. 74
69 See Miles C. Cortez, Jr., & Christopher T. Macaulay, The Constitutionality of Term
Limitation, 19 COLO. LAw. 2192, 2194 (1990).
70 P. Allan Dionisopoulos lists five "disqualifications," in addition to the three
standing qualifications:
[A]rticle I, section 6, prohibits Congressmen from holding a second office
under the United States; article IV, section 4, which guarantees a republican form of government to the States, also serves to disqualify any Member-elect whose State government is not republican in form; article VI,
clause 3, requires that Senators, Representatives, and other national and
State officers execute an oath to support the Constitution of he [sic]
United States, and section 3 of the fourteenth amendment disqualifies
any person, who, having previously taken the foregoing oath, violates it
by engaging in insurrection or by giving aid or comfort to the enemies of
the United States.
P. Allan Dionisopoulos, A Commentary on the ConstitutionalIssues in Powell and Related Cases,
17J. PUB. L. 103, 108 n.16 (1968); see also THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 108 nn.5, 9 (J.H. Killian ed., 1987) (noting

similar disqualifications); Corwin, supra note 7, at 579 n.65 (same).
71
The United States Supreme Court is among the courts that have suggested this.
See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520 n.41 (1969).
72 E.g., 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 623-628 (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833). Story argues that "when the constitution established certain qualifications, as necessary for office, it meant to exclude all
others .. ."Id. § 624. Thomas Jefferson claimed that the states could adopt additional
qualifications for legislators, since the Ninth Amendment reserved this undelegated
power to the states. Id. §§ 624-625. Story correctly notes, however, that the states
could not reserve a power that they did not have prior to the adoption of the Constitution. The states could not reserve a power to make additional congressional qualifications because the Constitution itself was the original delegation to the states of the
power to elect representatives. Id. § § 625-626. Jefferson's "reservation of undelegated
power" theory thus fails.
73
THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
74
In 1807, the House refused to disqualify William McCreery, even though he did
not meet additional state residency requirements. Powell, 395 U.S. at 542. The House
Committee of Elections said that it "considered the qualifications of members to have
been unalterably determined by the Federal Convention [of 1789] ...that neither the
State nor the Federal Legislatures are vested with authority to add to those qualifications, so as to change them .. " 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 872 (1807). The Powell Court
noted that "[tihere was no significant challenge to these principles for the next several
decades." Powell, 395 U.S. at 543.
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During and after the Civil War, however, Congress occasionally

prevented elected congressional candidates from taking their seats
on the basis of extra-constitutional qualifications, though the rejected legislators never challenged these actions in court. 75 The
Supreme Court has said that these congressional exclusions are of
limited precedential value: "[t]hat an unconstitutional action has
been taken before surely does not render that same action any less
unconstitutional at a later date."'7 6 Current case law forecloses Con-

gress and the states from limiting voter choice by imposing substan77
tive qualifications for Congress.
b.

The Standing QualificationsAre Not Themselves Substantive
Restrictions on Voter Choice

The Constitution appears to place some substantive restrictions
on voter choice because Congress can refuse to seat members-elect
who do not meet Article I's standing qualifications. 78 These qualifications, however, place limits on candidacy and voter choice that are
more procedural than substantive. A nation must have some means
of defining certain aspects of its sovereignty, such as its territorial
boundaries and its citizens.7 9 To define a citizen, a nation must establish who counts as a "person" in various contexts. This definition is not the same in every situation, of course. For instance, only
duly registered voters count as persons in the electoral context, but
80
all human beings are persons under the criminal law.
The standing qualifications are such a means of political definition. The state residency requirement for legislators defines "persons" eligible to represent a state. Someone who does not reside in
a state when elected is arguably a less effective representative of that
state than someone who does.8 ' Similarly, the U.S. citizenship requirement defines the very broad group of persons from which the
75 In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress passed a statute requiring that members swear they had not been disloyal to the Union government. Act ofJuly 2, 1862, 12
Stat. 502. Under this law, "[s]everal persons were refused seats by both Houses because
of charges of disloyalty and thereafter House practice, and Senate practice as well, was

erratic [footnotes omitted]."

THE CONsTrrTON OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

supra note 70, at 108 (footnote omitted).
Powell, 395 U.S. at 546-47.
77 This Note discusses the leading case of Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969), the Supreme Court's most extensive reading of the Qualifications Clauses, infra
at part II.A.2.
78 See Powell, 395 U.S. at 548.
79 See GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 57-58 (5th ed. 1986).
80 Even the reach of the criminal law extends only to those with the capacity to
understand their acts. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Proposed Official Draft

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,

76

1962) (excluding responsibility in the case of mental disease or defect).

81

Compare satirist Tom Lehrer's comment on a 1960s recording that Massachusetts

was the only state to have three senators (referring to Massachusetts native Robert F.
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voters may choose their representatives in Congress. The citizenship requirement also prevents undue foreign influence in the federal legislature.8 2 The age requirement is slightly more
problematic, for it is unclear why a person who is old enough to
83
drink, vote, and enter contracts may not also serve in Congress.
Apparently the members of the Constitutional Convention doubted
a younger person's ability to serve effectively as a legislator.8 4 Perhaps a way to think of the age requirement is that it does not regulate whether a candidate may run but only when she can run (i.e., after
she has attained the requisite age).85
Thus, the standing qualifications are definitions necessary for
establishing and preserving a representative legislature. The goal of
the Framers in setting the standing qualifications was not to limit
substantive voter choice, but rather to establish minimum standards
for representation in Congress. 86 Though the standing qualifications may incidentally restrict voter choice, they are only a minimal
procedural burden. The Constitution itself provides that Congress
and the states may regulate the procedure of elections. 87 The Constitution allows these minimal procedural burdens on voter choice
only because they are necessary to establish and preserve the federal
legislature.
2.

Powell v. McCormack Supports Unfettered Voter Choice

Though the Supreme Court has never directly barred Congress
or the states from superadding legislative qualifications, in Powell v.
McCormack 88 the Court gave its most detailed reading of the philosophy and history of the Qualifications Clauses. This reading
strongly confirms the value of substantive voter choice.
Kennedy, then a senator representing New York). TOM LEHRER, THAT WAS THE YEAR
THAT WAS (Reprise 1965).
82 A legislator may be a naturalized citizen as well. This requirement differs from
Article II, § 1, cl. 5 of the Constitution, which requires that the President be a "natural
born Citizen."
83
Apparently some of the Convention delegates shared this sentiment. When discussing the age qualification for Representatives, James Wilson of Pennsylvania said he
.was against abridging the rights of election in any shape. It was the same thing whether
this were done by disqualifying the objects of choice, or the persons chusing." DRAFrING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION supra note 23, at 242.
84 See id.
85 Josh Swift suggested this idea to the author.
86 This view is supported by the Convention's consideration and rejection of a requirement that legislators hold a certain amount of property. See WARREN, supra note 28,
at 416-19.
87 See infra part II.B.1.
88 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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a.

The Facts and Holding of Powell v. McCormack

In November 1966 Representative Adam Clayton Powell won
election to the 90th Congress, 8 9 but allegations that he had misappropriated public funds during earlier terms in Congress and
abused the process of the New York courts tainted his election. 90
Because of Powell's alleged wrongdoing, the House did not seat him
when it seated other members-elect in January 1967.91 The House
formed a Select Committee to determine Powell's eligibility to sit in
the 90th Congress. 92 The Committee's report found that while
Powell had met the standing qualifications of Article I, Section 2,
Clause 2, he had "asserted an unwarranted privilege and immunity
from the processes of the courts of New York; that he had wrongfully diverted House funds for the use of others and himself; and
that he had made false reports on expenditures of foreign currency
to the Committee on House Administration. ' 9 3 The House voted in
94
March 1967 to exclude Powell and declare his seat vacant.
Powell and several of his constituents then sued John McCormack, the Speaker of the House. 95 Powell claimed that the standing
qualifications in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 were the exclusive
qualifications for membership in the House of Representatives. 96 In
the Supreme Court, McCormack argued that the issue of the qualifications of a member-elect of the House was a non-justiciable political question. 97 McCormack claimed that Article I, Section 5, which
states that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members," 9 8s is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department." 99 According to McCormack, the power of the

89

Powell had previously served in Congress as well. See id at 489-90.

90

See id at 490, 492.

91

I at 490.

92

Id.

93
94

Id. at 492 (citing H.R. REP. No. 27, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1967)).
H. R. REs. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (enacted).

95

Powell also joined several other members and non-elected employees of the

House in his suit. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 493.
96
97

Id.

99

Powell, 395 U.S. at 518 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).

McCormack also argued that the litigation was moot, that the Speech and Debate
Clause barred judicial review of the House's actions, that Powell's exclusion was consistent with the House's power to expel members, and that the Court had no subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. at 495.
98 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
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House to judge the qualifications of its members and exclude' 0 0
whom it wished is plenary and judicially unreviewable. 01'
In an opinion by Chief Justice Warren, the Court held that
"Art. I, § 5, is at most a 'textually demonstrable commitment' to
Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the
Constitution."' 10 2 McCormack had conceded that Powell met the
standing qualifications, and "since [Powell] was duly elected by the
voters of the 18th Congressional District of New York and was not
ineligible to serve under any provision of the Constitution, the
' 03
House was without power to exclude him from its membership."'
Though Chief Justice Warren discussed the Qualifications Clauses
throughout the Powell opinion, the Court based its decision solely
on Article I, Section 5, which states that the House has the power to
judge the qualifications of its members.' 0 4 The holding is thus limited to the proposition that Congress' 10 5 power to judge the qualifications of its members under Article I, Section 5 extends only to
determining whether the member has met the standing qualifications found in the Constitution.
b.

The Powell Court's Reading of the History and Philosophy of
the Qualifications Clauses Supports the Value of
Substantive Voter Choice

In reaching this holding, however, the majority read the history
and philosophy of Article 1, Section 2 in a way that supports the
value of voter choice. Speaker McCormack claimed that both English and American practice supported the view that Article I's qualifications were merely "standing incapacities" to membership but
that Congress still retained its power to exclude members for other
reasons.' 0 6 The Court firmly rejected McCormack's claim in its
100 McCormack argued that the House's refusal to seat Powell in the 90th Congress
was in substance an exercise of the House's undisputed power, under Article 1, § 5, cl.
2, to expel a Representative for any reason upon a two-thirds vote of the House. The
Court found that the action was an exclusion. It did not reach the issue of whether the
House's action would have been constitutional had the House first seated Powell, then
expelled him. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 511-12.
101 Id- at 519.
102
Id. at 548. Justice Stewart dissented on mootness grounds. Id. at 559 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
103
104

Id. at 550.

Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 69, at 2194.
Even though the facts in Powell only concern the House's attempts to exclude a
Representative, the holding is based on Article I, § 5, cl. 1, which applies to the Senate
as well. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 522 n.44; Troy A. Eid &Jim Kolbe, The New Anti-Federalism: The Constitutionalityof State-Imposed Limits on Congressional Terms of Office, 69 DENV. U.
L. REv. 1, 45 n.239 (1992).
106 Powell, 395 U.S. at 522.
105
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reading of the history and philosophy of the Qualifications
07
Clauses.
The Court first examined English pre-Convention precedent'0
and concluded:
[After a] long and bitter struggle for the right of the British electorate to be represented by men of their own choice, it is evident
that, on the eve of the Constitutional Convention... the House of
Commons ...repudiated any "control over the eligibility of candidates, except in the administration of the laws which define their
[standing] qualifications."' 10 9
The "long and bitter struggle" refers to the conflict over the English Parliament's exclusion ofJohn Wilkes from the House of Commons. The House of Commons excluded Wilkes in 1769 for
publishing attacks on ministers of the King. 1 10 Though his district
continued to elect Wilkes to Parliament, the House of Commons did
not seat him until 1782.111 The Court's opinion characterizes the
right violated by Parliament as the "right of the British electorate to
be represented by men of their own choice." 112 Put another way,
the Court observed that the House of Commons, though a representative body itself, could not foreclose the electorate's choice of
representatives.
Next, the Court examined the proceedings of the U.S. Constitutional Convention of 1787. The Court noted that the Convention
adopted age, residency, and citizenship requirements for legislators
with little debate. 1 13 Proposed property requirements were more
controversial, however. 114 The Court quoted Madison's argument
that allowing Congress to set property qualifications would vest the
legislature with too much power. 1 15 If Congress could set the qualifications of its members, according to Madison, it might render the
electoral system ineffective by setting qualifications that only persons of the legislature's choice could meet. 116 Consequently, the
107
For a discussion of the history of term limits prior to the Constitutional Convention, see Barnicle, supra note 10, at 416-20.
108 Powell, 395 U.S. at 522-31.
109 Id at 528-29 (quoting T. MAY'S PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 66 (T.Webster ed.,
13th ed., 1924)).
110 WiLLIAM HoLuswoRTH, 10 A HIsTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 99-100 (1938).
M Id.
112 Powell, 395 U.S. at 528 (emphasis added).
113 Id. at 532-33.
114 George Mason, representing Virginia, proposed property qualifications for legislators. Charles Pinckney and General Charles C. Pinckney, both of South Carolina,
wanted to include property qualifications for the Executive and Judicial branches. See
WARREN, supra note 28, at 417.

Powell, 395 U.S. at 533-34 (quoting 2 Farrand 249-50).
116 Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 59, at 363 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that "an exclusive power of regulating elections for the national
115
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Convention rejected the proposed property qualifications. 1 7 The
Court concluded that "on this critical day the Framers were facing
and then rejecting the possibility that the legislature would have
power to usurp the 'indisputable right [of the people] to return
whom they thought proper' to the legislature."' 18
The narrow holding of Powell does not prohibit a state from limiting the terms of its representatives. Dicta and the general tenor of
the opinion, however, support the thesis that substantively unfettered voter choice is a primary value in congressional elections: 19
Had the intent of the Framers emerged from [the historical]
materials with less clarity, we would nevertheless have been compelled to resolve any ambiguity in favor of a narrow construction
of the scope of Congress' power to exclude members-elect. A
fundamental principle of our representative democracy is, in
Hamilton's words, "that the people should choose whom they
please to govern them." As Madison pointed out at the Convention, this principle is undermined as much by limiting whom the
people can select as by limiting the franchise itself. In apparent
agreement with this basic philosophy, the20Convention adopted his
suggestion limiting the power to expel.'
Indeed, the opinion suggests that the principle of elector choice was
the chief reason that the Framers chose to limit Congress' power to
exclude members-elect.
Term limitations undermine the Framers' clear intent that "the
people should choose whom they please to govern them."' 21 Because term limitations would contract voter choice by adding to the
minimal legislative qualifications of the Constitution, they are presumptively unconstitutional.

government, in the hands of the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the
Union entirely at their mercy").
117
After Benjamin Franklin observed that "[slome of the greatest rogues he was
ever acquainted with, were the richest rogues," the Convention rejected Charles Pinckney's motion that all three branches of the federal government have property qualifications. WARREN, supra note 28, at 419.
118 Powell, 395 U.S. at 535 (footnote omitted) (quoting 16 PARL. HIsT. ENG. 589
(1769)).
119 See The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Leading Cases, 83 HARv. L. REv. 62, 77 (19691970).
120
Powell, 395 U.S. at 547 (citation omitted).
121

Id.
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Case Law Has Preserved the Distinction Between
Substantive and Procedural Regulations, and Term
Limitations Are An Unconstitutional Substantive
Qualification for Congress

Accurate analysis of the constitutionality of term limitations requires preserving the distinction between procedural and substantive regulations of candidacy. This is because procedural
regulations generally are constitutional under the Times, Places,
and Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4,122 while substantive regulations generally are not (under the Qualifications Clauses jurisprudence). 123 Broadly, a procedural regulation affects how a legislator
may gain election. A substantive regulation affects who may gain
election. It is appropriate to classify term limitations as a substantive regulation because they affect a voter's choice of whom she can
select as her representative.
Courts have often noted that the line between procedure and
substance is not sharp. 124 As Erie Railroad v. Tompkins' 25 and its
progeny show, courts must nevertheless draw the line somewhere.
Some supporters of term limitations argue that Congress' and the
states' undisputed power to regulate the manner of elections 126 has,
in effect, a substantive component. 127 This is true, insofar as any
regulation marginally influences who can be elected. Term limitation supporters have tried to use this argument "to achieve indirectly what the Standing Qualifications Clauses directly forbid."' 12 8
In the cases germane to term limitations, courts have drawn the line
between substance and procedure by allowing a state to regulate
elections so long as the regulation has a valid procedural purpose
and does not prevent an entire group of candidates from running. 2 9
If an election regulation does foreclose a group from congressional
candidacy, as a term limitation would, it is an unconstitutional additional qualification.13 0 In the congressional qualifications context,
then, a substantive regulation involves "a sweeping elimination of
broad categories of people"'' from election eligibility.
For the text of this clause, see supra note 63.
See Eid & Kolbe, supra note 105, at 46-47.
124 See, e.g., Brown v. Western Ry., 338 U.S. 294, 296 (1949).
125
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
126 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, d. 1.
127
Eid & Kolbe, supra note 105, at 46.
128
Ide at 47.
129 Id at 47-50 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1973) and Williams v. Tucker,
382 F. Supp. 381 (D. Pa. 1974)).
130
See id. at 50.
131
Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853, 859 (2d Cir. 1980).
122
123

986

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:966

1. The Constitution Provides That Congress and the States May
Regulate the Procedure of CongressionalElections
The Constitution plainly gives Congress and the states power
to regulate the procedure of Congressional elections. This comports with the value of substantive voter choice, since some minimal
procedural regulations are necessary to allow effective representation at all.' 3 2 Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 states that "[t]he Times,
Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof;
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations."' 33 This language merely grants to Congress and the states
the power to regulate the procedure of elections; it does not rule out
substantive regulations. 3 4 The case law, however, does not support
an interpretation of the language that allows Congress and the
states to impose additional substantive qualifications on candidates
for Congress.
2.

Term Limitations Are Not Procedural Times, Places, and Manner
Regulations

Supporters of term limitations argue that states may limit terms
of federal legislators through the states' power to regulate elections
under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the Constitution.13 5 Though
the Supreme Court has never decided what restrictions are impermissible qualifications under the Qualifications Clauses, 136 other
state and federal courts have provided a test to resolve such issues.
In Hopfmann v. Connolly,13 7 for example, the First Circuit held that
"the test to determine whether or not [a] 'restriction' amounts to a
'qualification' within the meaning of Article I, Section 3, is whether
See supra part I.C.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, c. 1 (emphasis added).
1.34 The Supreme Court has hinted that if Congress has a constitutional power to
impose substantive qualifications, this power must come from Article I, § 4. In Buckley v.
Valeo, the Court noted:
The power of each House to judge whether one claiming election as Senator or Representative has met the requisite qualifications cannot reasonably be translated into a power granted to the Congress itself to impose
substantive qualifications on the right to so hold such office. Whatever
power Congress may have to legislate such qualifications must derive
from § 4, rather than § 5, of Art. I.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133 (1976) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see Eid &
Kolbe, supra note 105, at 45 n.241; Levy, supra note 3, at 1920.
135 See Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 69, at 2194-96; see also Steven Glazier, Each
State Can Limit Re-Election to Congress, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1990, at A18 (arguing that
states can circumvent difficulty of passing a constitutional amendment limiting terms by
using their constitutional power to regulate times, places, and manner of elections).
136 Levy, supra note 3, at 1921.
137 746 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1984).
132
133
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the candidate 'could be elected if his name were written in by a sufficient number of electors.' "138 Term limitations would fail such a
test, because they would categorically forbid voters from voting for
an incumbent.
In an article defending the constitutionality of the federal term
limitation amendment to the Colorado constitution, Miles C. Cortez, Jr. and Christopher T. Macaulay claim that the line of cases
dealing with ballot access and resign-to-run laws1 3 9 establish that
"state action which protects a legitimate state interest can survive a
Qualifications Clause attack even if an indirect burden on a candidate's access to the ballot results by the addition of a 'qualification.' "140 Cortez and Macaulay base their conclusion, however,
141
upon a misreading of the relevant case law.
a.

The Ballot Access Cases

Cortez and Macaulay cite Storer v. Brown, 14 2 a ballot access case,
for the proposition that a state may add substantive qualifications to
the standing qualifications for Congress. Storer involved a challenge
to a California statute that forbade independent candidates from appearing on the ballot in state or federal elections if they had been
affiliated with a political party one year or less before the preceding
primary.' 48 According to Cortez and Macaulay, Storer held that
states may establish additional qualifications according to "a flexible
standard in which legitimate state interests protected by the law in
question are weighed against the interests of persons adversely afId at 103 (citing State v. Crane, 197 P.2d 864, 871 (Wyo. 1948)).
The classification of the Article 1, § 4 cases into ballot access and resign-to-run
cases is from Eid & Kolbe, supra note 105, passim.
140
Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 69, at 2196. Stephen Glazier follows a similar line
of argument, supra note 136, at A18.
141
As Eid and Kolbe note, the claim that the Times, Places and Manner Clause supports term limitations relies on the faulty premise that
the Standing Qualifications Clauses are not the exclusive criteria for congressional service. It is beyond doubt that the Times, Places and Manner
Clause lets states regulate the machinery of federal elections. But it does
not empower states to deny congressional membership to persons who
otherwise meet the standing qualifications of age, residency and citizenship. The Standing Qualifications Clauses of sections 2 and 3 are substantive rules, defining who is eligible to serve in the House and Senate,
respectively. In contrast, Section 4 allows states to design the procedures
for their election. Together, these three clauses are part of a coherent
scheme; they simply cannot be read in isolation. Importing a substantive
component into the word "Manner" so that states may define who is eligible to serve in Congress can have but one result: to achieve indirectly
what the Standing Qualifications Clauses directly forbid.
Eid & Kolbe, supra note 105, at 46-47 (footnote omitted).
142
415 U.S. 724 (1974).
143
See ida at 726-27.
138

139
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fected by the qualification." 144 This is, however, an untenable reading of the case.
First, the candidates in Storer argued that the statute violated the
Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and the Qualifications Clauses.' 45 The "flexible standard" that Cortez and Macaulay
discuss relates only to the First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges, not to the Article I Qualifications Clauses challenges. After
discussing the flexible standard test, 14 6 the Court noted:
Appellants also contend that [the California statute] purports to
establish an additional qualification for office of Representative
and is invalid under Art I, § 2, cl. 2, of the Constitution. The argument is wholly without merit ....The non-affiliation requirement no more establishes an additional requirement for the office
of Representative than the requirement that the candidate win the
primary to secure a place on the general ballot or otherwise
47
demonstrate substantial community support.'
The obvious inference is that the Court's earlier discussion of a flexible standard applied only to the appellants' argument that the California statute burdened First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.' 48
Thus, Storer cannot be read to establish a flexible standard test for a
Qualifications Clause challenge, simply because the California statute before the Court was not a qualification.
Second, the Court made clear that the ballot access limitations
it held constitutional were merely procedural restrictions on candidacy. These procedural restrictions fall within the state's power to
regulate the times, places, and manner of elections. 149 The Court
characterized the California statute as "expressive of a general state
policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the
ballot. It involves no discrimination against independents."'15 0 The
California statute did not prevent a group of persons (in this case
independent candidates) from gaining a place on the ballot.' 5 1 It
was therefore not a substantive regulation. Rather, the statute was
merely a times, places, and manner regulation of elections, akin to
Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 69, at 2194.
Storer, 415 U.S. at 727.
146 Id. 729-30.
147 Id. at 746 n.16 (emphasis added).
148
For a discussion of term limitation challenges based on the First Amendment
and Equal Protection Clause, see Latz, supra note 5, at 206-08.
149 Eid and Kolbe concur in this reading of the case: "[Storer] permit[s] states to
deny ballot access for valid procedural reasons. [Storer does not] let[] states impose their
own substantive qualifications for holding congressional office." Eid & Kolbe, supra note
105, at 47.
150 Storer, 415 U.S. at 733.
144
145

151

See id.
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the nominating process.1 52 It was thus a valid procedural regulation. Cortez and Macaulay's claim that the Storer Court permitted a
state to impose substantive limitations upon candidacy is erroneous
because substantive limitations were not before the Court.
Cortez and Macaulay assert that another ballot access case, Williams v. Tucker, 153 supports their reading of Storer.'5 4 In Williams, a
Pennsylvania statute prevented a congressional candidate' 55 who
had lost in the party primary from running as an independent in the
general election.' 56 Applying Storer, the district court held that the
statute "merely regulates the manner of holding elections and does
not add qualifications for office."' 57 Williams thus holds that a state
may regulate the procedure of elections without being vulnerable to
a Qualifications Clauses challenge. According to Wall Street Journal commentator Stephen Glazier, Williams means that "states can
restrict access of congressional incumbents to the ballot, by using
one-year waiting periods before running for re-election, in order to
pursue the [legitimate] state interest in an effective election process."' 158 Again, supporters of term limitations (e.g., Cortez, Macaulay, and Glazier) mistakenly read the case law as allowing
substantive limitations on candidacy. The Williams opinion does not
uphold the Pennsylvania statute because the state has followed the
proper procedure to impose substantive limitations on an incumbent. Rather, the court upholds the statute because it is only a procedural regulation of elections.' 59
b.

The Resign-to-Run Cases

Resign-to-run laws are typically of two types. One requires prospective candidates who currently hold an office to resign as a condi152

153
154
155

See id. at 746 n.16.
382 F. Supp. 381 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
See Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 69, at 2194.
The candidate was an incumbent, but this is not important to the holding of the

case.
156

157
158

57.

Williams, 382 F. Supp. at 382-84.
Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
Glazier, supra note 136. Eid & Kolbe note Glazier's argument, supra note 105, at

159
Eid and Kolbe suggest that Storer and Williams set forth a two-part test for time,
place, and manner restrictions:
1) Does the state law in question regulate election procedures for congressional candidates, and 2) if so, does the state have a legitimate interest in those procedures that is sufficiently compelling to outweigh First
and Fourteenth Amendment values? If however, a state law purports to
disqualify an entire class of persons from standing for re-election-as
congressional term limits would do in the case of incumbents-then the
Times, Places and Manner Clause [Art. I, § 4, cl. 1] simply does not
apply.
Eid & Kolbe, supra note 105, at 50.
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tion to running for a new position. The other requires the officeholder to automatically resign her office upon filing her candidacy
for another. 160 Term limitation supporters correctly note that
courts have often upheld these laws. 16 1 But they erroneously claim
that the resign-to-run precedents establish that a state may limit the
terms of legislators based on the state's compelling interest in limiting incumbency.' 62 For example, Glazier argues that:
[t]he thrust of [the resign-to-run] cases is that the actions of a
democratically elected state government will not be frustrated by
the "no additional qualifications" clauses, if the state limits candidates for its congressional races in a way that does not offend freedom of speech or equal protection and that pursues some state
interest.
A state law restricting an incumbent in Congress from merely
succeeding himself in that office after a number of years would
3
pass these tests. 16
Once again, the term limit supporters err in their reading of the
cases. An examination of the resign-to-run cases cited by Cortez,
Macaulay, and Glazier shows that while a state may indirectly regulate incumbency under its power to control the procedure of elections, it may not impose a substantive bar to candidacy on
incumbents as a group consistent with the Qualifications Clauses.
To illustrate, Signorelli v. Evans 164 concerned a provision of the
New York Constitution that effectively required state judges to resign their judicial posts before running for other offices. 165
Signorelli, a New York state probate judge who wanted to run for
Congress, challenged the state constitutional provision on the
ground that it imposed an additional qualification in violation of Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution. 1 66 In a careful
opinion, the Second Circuit found that New York's regulatory
scheme does not prohibit incumbents from running for other offices.
Cir. 1980).
See, e.g.,Joyner v. Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1002 (1983).
162 Cortez and Macaulay claim that
[i]f evidence establishes that election outcomes are predetermined or results guaranteed within two or three percentage points, the state has an
obligation to adopt measures necessary to insure that the people are able
to exercise the franchise in fair and open elections. There is no more
basic area of legitimate and traditional state interest.
Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 69, at 2196.
163
Glazier, supra note 136, at A18.
164
637 F.2d 853 (2d. Cir. 1980).
165 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 20(b).
166 Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 856. Signorelli also challenged the constitutional provision
on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds, but lost in the district court and did not
appeal that holding. Id. at 856 n.1.
160
161

See, e.g., Signorelli v. Evans, 637 F.2d 853 (2d
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Rather, the scheme "confronts the prospective candidate with a
choice: he may run for Congress if he is willing to resign his judgeship ... New York places no obstacle between Signorelli and the
ballot .... ,1167 The court notes, however, that the choice the statute
affords a candidate-to avoid the qualification by resigning--does
not render the qualification constitutional. 68 Other courts have
held that state laws that require a candidate for Congress to live in
the local congressional district are an unconstitutional additional
qualification even though a candidate could avoid this qualification
169
simply by choosing to move to the district.
The Signorelli court conceded that New York's scheme indirectly
170
imposed an additional qualification on candidates for Congress.
The court observed, however, that the purpose of the New York
scheme was not to regulate congressional elections, but to regulate
state judicial elections: "a state regulation, though it functions indirectly as a requirement for Congressional candidacy, may not necessarily be an unconstitutional additional qualification if it is designed
7
to deal with a subject within traditional state authority."' '
Term limitation supporters urge that this language allows states
to impose term limitations because they are election regulations
within the states' authority. 17 2 This argument relies on two mistaken premises. First, term limitation supporters assert that setting
qualifications for Congress is a power traditionally within a state's
authority. 173 The history of the framing of the Constitution establishes, however, that the power to set qualifications for Congress is
not within the traditional authority of a state to regulate elections. 174 During the Convention of 1787, the Committee of Detail
proposed that the state legislatures be given the authority to set
property qualifications. 1 75 The Convention firmly rejected this and
also rejected a proposal that Congress have unlimited power to fix
qualifications.' 76 The Signorelli court repudiated the idea that the
167

168

Id. at 858.
Id

169 See, e.g., Exon v. Tiemann, 279 F. Supp. 609 (D. Neb. 1968); State ex reL Chavez v.
Evans, 446 P.2d 445 (1968) (holding that a state law which required a Congressional
candidate to live within the district is an unconstitutional additional qualification).
170 Signorelli, 687 F.2d at 858.
171 IdL at 859 (emphasis added).
172 See, e.g., Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 69, at 2194.
173
See id at 2196; see also Eid & Kolbe, supra note 105, at 42-43 (observing that the
Framers considered and rejected allowing the states or Congress to fix qualifications for
Congress).
174 See supra part II.
175
WARREN, supra note 28, at 418.
176 Id. at 419.
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states have power to set qualifications for Congress if the regulation
dovetails with a power that is within "traditional state authority":
[I]t can be argued that New York's purpose is to regulate the judicial office that Signorelli holds, not the Congressional office he
seeks. There is a distinct risk, however, that this line of argument
... would permit the states, exercising their acknowledged authority to regulate occupations, to require lawyers to resign from
the bar or business executives to resign corporate offices prior to
seeking public office. But such a sweeping elimination of broad
categories of people from those eligible for election would conflict with the expressed intent of the Framers to maintain broad
177
public choice of elected representatives.
This dictum strongly suggests that states may not impinge upon the
value of choice under the pretense that the state is exercising powers that are within its "traditional regulatory authority." 178
Second, term limitation supporters imply that a term limitation
is merely an "indirect" qualification. 1 79 The Signorelli court, however, asserts that regulations which "sweeping[ly] eliminat[e] broad
categories of people" from running for election are not merely indirect qualifications.18 0 The court links this language with the
Framer's expressed intent to allow broad choice of representatives.' 8 1 Because a term limitation thwarts a voter's choice of representatives by "sweepingly eliminating the category of incumbents,"
a court applying Signorelli should hold that a term limitation is an
impermissible substantive regulation rather than merely an indirect
qualification.
The other resign-to-run case that term limitation supporters
often cite as authority for the constitutionality of term limitations is
Joyner v. Mofford.18 2 The regulatory scheme at issue in Joyner was
similar to that in Signorelli. Article 22, Section 18 of the Arizona
Constitution provides that: "Except during the final year of the term
being served, no incumbent of a salaried elective office... may offer
himself for nomination or election to any salaried local, State or federal office." 183 An Arizona statute18 4 provided that the state could
force a state official who ran for a federal office in violation of this
Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 859.
The scheme at issue in Signorelli survived this challenge because it dealt with
"specified state offices peculiarly within the essential regulatory authority of the states."
177
178

Id (emphasis added).
179 See Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 69, at 2194.
180 Signorelli, 637 F.2d at 859.
181

See id.

182

706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1983).
ARIz. CONsT. art. 22, § 18.
ARxz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2041, 12-2042 (1982).

183
184

NOTE-CHOICE & TERM LIMITATIONS

1993]

993

provision of the Arizona Constitution to resign from her office.1 s5
The combination of Article 22 of the Arizona Constitution and the
Arizona forced resignation statute made this scheme in essence a
resign-to-run regulation. In its Qualifications Clauses analysis, the
Ninth Circuit distinguished between state laws that only regulate the
actions of state officials and those that actually bar candidates from
running for Congress. The former are merely indirect burdens on
candidacy and, as such, are constitutional. The latter type of law,
however, violates the Qualifications Clauses. 18 6 Because the Arizona scheme did not actually bar candidates from running for Congress, the court upheld the regulation against a Qualifications
87
Clauses challenge.'
3.

Term Limitations are an UnconstitutionalAdditional Substantive
Qualificationfor Congress

Term limitation supporters argue that term limitations are permissible procedural regulations, not prohibited substantive qualifications.1 8 8 According to cases that interpret the Qualifications
Clauses, however, a court should hold that a term limitation is an
additional substantive qualification for Congress. Joyner v. Mofford
gives the appropriate test for distinguishing substantive qualifications from procedural regulations:
The courts considering challenges to state laws relying on the
Qualifications Clause have distinguished between state provisions
which bar a potential candidate from running for federal office,
and those which merely regulate the conduct of state officeholders. The former category of laws imposes additional qualifications
on candidates and therefore violates the Qualifications Clause,
while the latter category is constitutionally acceptable since it
merely bars state officeholders from remaining in their positions
should they choose to run for federal office. The burden on candidacy, imposed by laws of the latter category, is indirect and attributable to a desire to regulate state officeholders and not to
impose additional qualifications to serving in Congress.189

185
186
187
188
189

Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1526.
Id. at 1528.

Id. at 1533.

See Cortez & Macaulay, supra note 69, at 2196; Latz, supra note 5, at 210.
Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528; see, e.g., State ex reL Pickrell v. Senner, 375 P.2d 728
(1962) (holding unconstitutional an Arizona law which provided that incumbent state
officeholders would not be eligible for federal office); State ex reL Santini v. Swackhamer,
521 P.2d 568 (1974) (holding that the Nevada Secretary of State could not refuse to
allow a state judge to file for election to the House of Representatives).
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According to theJoyner court, a state bar on federal candidacy is allowable only if the primary purpose of the law is to regulate state
officeholders. 19 0
For a court to declare a law unconstitutional under this test, the
law must fail both an "effect" prong and a "purpose" prong. A law
which has the effect of barring "a potential candidate from running
for federal office" 1 9 1 fails the effect prong. Congress and the states
have the power to regulate the procedure of elections, and the states
have the power to regulate their own officeholders.' 92 A procedural
regulation whose purpose is merely "to regulate state officeholders
and not to impose additional qualifications to serving in Congress" 193 will likely survive the purpose prong even though it fails
the effect prong, because such a law is an allowable regulation of
elections or of state officeholders which only indirectly burdens federal candidacy.
A term limitation fails both prongs, however, because both its
primary purpose and its effect are to "bar a potential candidate from
running for federal office." 1 9 4 UnderJoyner, term limitations are not
procedural regulations. Rather, they are a qualification that requires that candidates be non-incumbents in order to run for the
federal legislature. Term limitations are substantive qualifications
because they regulate whom a voter may choose as a representative.
Because term limitations are extra-constitutional substantive qualifications, a court should hold them unconstitutional.
C.

Some Constitutional Alternatives to Term Limitation Laws
and State Constitutional Amendments

There are other possible solutions to the problem of congressional incumbency that would pass constitutional muster. This Section discusses the most important of these solutions and notes that
while these proposals have the advantage of not impermissibly interfering with the value of substantive voter choice, they may not
adequately address the problem of an entrenched Congress.
1. Self-Imposed Term Limitations
The simplest solution is a self-imposed term limitation. An historical example of this (in the presidential context) is the TwentySecond Amendment. Before Franklin D. Roosevelt's tenure, two
four-year terms was the voluntary "term limit" for presidents.

193

Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528.
Id.
See supra part II.
Joyner, 706 F.2d at 1528.

194

Id.

190
191
192
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George Washington established this precedent by refusing to seek a
third term. 195 Roosevelt's decision to seek two additional terms led
to the adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment, which limits a
president to two terms. 196 Even if Franklin D. Roosevelt's four elections are an historical aberration, voluntary term limitation may not
be an entirely satisfactory solution to the problem of an entrenched
Congress.
First, depending upon legislators to regulate their own terms is
akin to letting the fox guard the hen house. The electorate's perception that an incumbency problem exists (note the recent spate of
term limitation initiatives) 197 is evidence that voluntary term limitation does not work, at least not to the extent that the electorate
wishes. Second, the structure of the federal system may actually disfavor candidates who express a desire to serve a limited number of
terms. This is because the power and effectiveness of legislators increases as they remain in office.' 98 A state can increase its influence
in Congress, especially in the Senate, by encouraging its experienced legislators to remain in office and accumulate clout. 199 All
other things being equal, a rational voter 200 may vote for an incumbent representative rather than a challenger in the hope of obtaining an advantage in Congress over citizens in states with less
senior representatives. 20'
2. Anti-Advantage Legislation
Short of a constitutional amendment, the most viable solution 202 to the incumbency problem might be laws that attempt to
195
STATES

196
197

See BERNARD
13 (1963).
See id.

ScI-wARTZ,

A

COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

See supra note 2.

198 Senator Dennis Deconcini (R. AZ), in explaining his repudiation of his initial
decision to serve only two terms in the Senate, asked:
What would have been achieved had I left the Senate after two terms?
Other States would continue to reelect their Senators, increasing their
seniority status and thus the representative political clout of their respective States. My State would have suffered as it would have been left with
two Senators with a combined seniority of 2 years.
137 CONG. REc. § 579-01, 2483 (1991) (statement of Sen. Deconcini).
199
200
201

Id.

Rational in an economist's sense, i.e., a rational self-interest maximizer.
Mark B. Liedl calls this the "ombudsman" theory of representation. Mark B.
Liedl, The Case For Limiting Congressional Terms, 137 CONG. REC. § 579-01, at 2489.
202 Erwin Chemerinsky suggests another way to address the incumbency problem.
Professor Chemerinsky argues that the political process is often unable to effectively
combat the problem of incumbency because incumbents accumulate an unfair advantage
by manipulating the prerogatives of their office. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protectingthe Democratic Process: Voter Standing to ChallengeAbuses of Incumbency, 49 OHIo ST. Lj. 773, 774-81
(1988). According to Chemerinsky, federal courts are the most efficacious forum to
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nullify the inherent advantage incumbents have in a campaign. 20 3
These anti-advantage laws would aim to level the political playing
field so that voters can exercise choice more effectively. Anti-advantage laws could potentially address two principal criticisms of incumbency. The first criticism is that because incumbent legislators
have direct access to the political process (i.e., they make the laws)
they are able to provide themselves with advantages that give them a
material edge over challengers. 20 4 The second criticism is that incumbent legislators receive the advantages of "political inertia. 20 5
Voters are more likely to have information and positive attitudes
about incumbents than they are about a challenger. 20 6 Therefore, a
challenger must expend much more money and time to overcome
this advantage than if both candidates were running for the first
time.
There are two possible types of anti-advantage laws, each aimed
at a different criticism of incumbents. A passive anti-advantage law
would address the first criticism by removing the advantages that
incumbents have acquired through their access to and manipulation
of the political process. For example, members of Congress have
traditionally had a franking privilege.2 0 7 This allows them to send
out certain types of mail at the taxpayer's expense, giving them a
financial advantage over challengers who must pay for their own
mailings. 20 8 Under a passive anti-advantage approach, regulations
would remove the franking privilege or other privileges that give
incumbents an advantage over challengers.
Active anti-advantage laws would actually provide challengers
with certain resources so that they can overcome the political inertia
combat abuses of incumbency, because courts feel less influence from the political process than do legislatures. See id at 778. Chemerinsky claims that the First and the Fourteenth Amendments could support causes of action in anti-incumbency litigation, id.
at
777-78, as could the fundamental right to vote found in Reynolds v.Sims; id.at 787-89.
Chemerinsky concedes, however, that such litigation has been largely unsuccessful. Id at
774; see, e.g.,
Winspisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied,446 U.S.
929 (1980); Public Citizen, Inc. v. Simon, 539 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Without a significant revision in election law jurisprudence, such as Chemerinsky
suggests, anti-incumbent litigation is an unpromising solution to the incumbency problem. See also Otteson, supra note 4, at 21-22 (arguing that judicial remedies are unsuited
for resolving the incumbency problem).
203 Advantages of incumbency are summarized in GARY C. JACOBSON, THE POLITICS
OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 34-42 (2d ed. 1987).
204 SeeJames A. Gardner, The Uses and Abuses of Incumbency: People v. Ohrenstein and
the Limits of Inherent Legislative Power, 60 FORDIAM L. REv. 217, 220 (1991).
205 Cf.WRIGHT, supra note 46, at 91 (suggesting that ceteris paribus, voters tend to
vote for incumbents).
206 See id.at 111.
207
See HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, MONEY IN POLITICS 242 (1972).
208 But cf.id.(arguing that although some incumbents abuse the franking privilege
during campaigns, most do not).
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that benefits incumbents. These laws can function as a political
handicap on incumbents. An example of an active anti-advantage
law is a differential public campaign financing bill that allots more
money to a challenger than to an incumbent. The allocation differential would be set at a proportion equivalent to the advantage that
20 9
the incumbent enjoys due to her incumbency.
Passive anti-incumbency laws are both more attractive and
more workable than active anti-incumbency laws. First, the appearance that the government is actively taking sides in an election, as
might happen with an active anti-advantage law such as a differential
campaign funding bill, violates Hamilton's idea that the people (not
the government) should choose their representatives.2 1 0 Passive
anti-advantage laws, however, put the government in a more neutral
position regarding elections. This would lessen the risk of the government impinging on a voter's right of electoral choice.2 1 1 Second,
the advantage that political inertia gives to an incumbent is hard to
measure. The difficulties in calculating an appropriate handicap,
necessary under an active anti-advantage law, would likely be intractable and would certainly give rise to litigation.2 12 Finally, Congress' self-interest would make it hesitant to approve of active antiadvantage legislation for the same reasons that legislators are unlikely to limit their own terms. Constituents could probably persuade Congress to remedy perceived abuses of the political
system, 2 13 but it appears unlikely that a measure that gives extra
campaign money to congressional challengers would gain much
2 14
support from incumbents.
D.

Bleeding the Constitutional Pressure Valve: Limiting the
Terms of Senators and Representatives by
Constitutional Amendment

Though this Note argues that the Constitution evinces a value
of substantive voter choice, it would be anomalous to claim that citizens absolutely may not choose to limit the substance of their future
choices. As Part I posits, one of the attributes of personal sovereignty is the power to choose to abandon a form of government. A
209 Cf Wright, supra note 46, at 84-104 (attempting to estimate an incumbent's electoral margin). Wright is dubious that "the incumbent's electoral margin... is the result
of the advantage of incumbency per se." Id. at 86.
210 See 2 EmoT'S DEBATES 257, quoted in Powell v. McCormick, 395 U.S. at 547
(1969).
211
Indeed, the argument might be that a measure such as eliminating the franking
privilege would actually remedy an existing governmental bias against challengers.
212 See WRcr, supra note 46, at 84-104.
213
See Gardner, supra note 205, at n.2.
214 See ALEXANDER, supra note 210, at 242.
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social contract that did not provide for such choices could not serve
its Lockean legitimating function.
Article V does provide for such choices, of course. It may be
that permissible sub-constitutional approaches to limiting the terms
of legislators, such as voluntary term limitations and passive antiadvantage laws, will not satisfy the large number of people who support mandatory term limitations.2 15 Though this Note has not resolved the policy arguments for and against term limitations, clearly
there are strong claims on both sides.2 1 6 It is also clear that a federal constitutional amendment limiting terms of legislators would
be more difficult to achieve than sub-constitutional approaches, especially given the current well-funded opposition to term limitations.2 1 7 In this case, however, the desire for a pragmatic solution
to the problem of an entrenched Congress cannot transform an unconstitutional law into a constitutional one. Those who want
mandatory limited legislative terms must follow the same path as
those who wanted limited presidential terms. The only constitutional means to limit absolutely congressional terms is to amend the
218
Constitution.
CONCLUSION

This Note argues that the value of voter choice underlies the
Constitution's Qualifications Clauses, which prohibit term limitations. The constitutional value of choice is rooted in the political
writings of John Locke. According to Locke, a democratic government can legitimately exercise power over its citizens only if they
consent. The theory of consent becomes manifest in the political
arena when a citizen chooses a representative in an election.
Though the value of choice implies that voters should have the maximum substantive choice possible, procedural regulation of elections is practically necessary for the election process to function
effectively.
215 See, e.g., Timothy Egan, The 1991 Election: Term Limits: State of Washington Rejects a
Plan to Curb Incumbents, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1991, at Al; Glazier, supra note 136, at A18.
216

See supra part II; AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, LIMITING PRESIDENTIAL AND

CONGRESSIONAL TERMS 18-25.

217 Glazier notes that "members of Congress are more than 2-to-1 opposed to the
idea" of limiting congressional terms by law. Glazier, supra note 136, at A18. The New
York Times lists the following groups as having opposed Washington State Initiative
553, which would have limited the terms of Washington's federal congressional repre-

sentatives: Phillip Morris USA, Washington State Labor Council, Kaiser Aluminum, the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America, Boeing Co., and the National Rifle Association.
Egan, supra note 216, at B9. See generally Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional
Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARv. L. REV. 386, 387-89 (1983) (giving an
overview of the amendment process).
218 See Eid & Kolbe, supra note 105, at 86.
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This Note urges that courts should hold term limitations unconstitutional using principles enunciated in the current case law.
The Constitution promotes substantive voter choice by fixing the
exclusive qualifications for federal legislators in the Qualifications
Clauses. After examining the history of congressional qualifications, the Supreme Court has found that the framers drafted the
Qualifications Clauses with the value of voter choice in mind. The
courts have supported this reading of the Constitution in a series of
cases holding that, under the Qualifications Clauses, Congress and
the states may not superadd substantive qualifications. The Constitution does allow Congress and the states to institute procedural
regulation of elections. Term limitations, however, are substantive
electoral regulations because they affect a voter's choice of representatives. Therefore, term limitations violate the Qualifications
Clauses, and courts should hold them unconstitutional.
The Constitution's system of electing representatives to the
federal legislature may be fundamentally flawed. Sub-constitutional
approaches to limiting the terms of members of Congress, though
constitutionally permissible, may not satisfactorily solve the problem of an entrenched Congress. The value of choice is illusory, according to some. 219 The Constitution may be inadequate to deal
with congressional dysfunctionalism in the late twentieth century. 220
But these arguments are separate from the question of how such reforms may constitutionally be achieved. If term limitation supporters want to reform the election process by instituting mandatory
term limitations, this reform must take place according to the procedures of change that the Constitution provides: the amendment or
convention provisions of Article V.221
JohnathanMansfield t

219
Cf Frady, supra note 39, at 36 (relating Jesse Jackson's characterization of the
American bipartisan system as "one party with 'two names' ").
220 James Otteson suggests that the congressional ratification route to amending the
Constitution is unlikely to succeed because Congress is unlikely to ratify an amendment
that runs counter to its self-interest. Otteson, supra note 4, at 34; cf Latz, supra note 5, at
155 n.6 (noting that "eight different constitutional amendments limiting members'
terms had been introduced in the 102nd Congress as of.February 14, 1991," but that
these had been unlikely to make it out of committee).
221 Id
t The author thanks Josh Swift, Jonathan R. Macey, Joshua Tanzer, and Mac Allan
for their help with this project. All the usual disclaimers apply.
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Roger C. Cramton, A.B., J.D., Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law
Yvonne M. Cripps, LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1993)
Alexander N. Domrin, Ph.D. in Law, Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
Theodore Eisenberg, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Cynthia R. Farina, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
David D. Friedman, B.A., M.S., Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law (1993-94)
Glenn G. Galbreath, B.A., J.D., Senior Lecturer
Claire M. Germain, M.A., LL.B., M.C.L., M.L.L., Edward Cornell Law Librarian and Professor of
Law

Robert A. Green, B.A., M.S., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
James J. Hanks, Jr., A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Visiting Practitioner (Fall 1993)
Herbert Hausmaninger, Dipl. Dolm., Dr. Jur., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
George A. Hay, B.S., M.A., Ph.D., Edward Cornell Professor of Law and Professor of Economics
James A. Henderson, Jr., A.B., LL.B., LL.M., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law
Jennifer G. Hill, B.A., LL.B., BCL, Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
Robert A. Hiliman, B.A., J.D., Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law
Barbara J. Holden-Smith, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Sheri Lynn Johnson, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Lily Kahng, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Associate Professor of Law
Robert B. Kent, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law, Emeritus
Jack Lipson, B.A., J.D., Visiting Practitioner (Spring 1994)
David B. Lyons, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Professor of Law and Philosophy (Sabbatic 1993-94)
Jonathan . Macey, B.A., J.D., J. DuPratt White Professor of Law
Peter W. Martin, A.B., J.D., Jane M.G. Foster Professor of Law
JoAnne M. Miner, B.A., J.D., Senior Lecturer and Director of Cornell Legal Aid Clinic
Peter-Christian Mililer-Graff, Dr. Jur., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
Hiroshi Oda, LL.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1993)
Russell K. Osgood, B.A., J.D., Dean of the Law Faculty and Professor of Law
Larry I. Palmer, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law (on leave 1993-94)
Ernest F. Roberts, Jr., B.A., LL.B., Edwin H. Woodruff Professor of Law
Faust F. Rossi, A.B., LL.B., Samuel S. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques
Bernard A. Rudden, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., LL.D., DCL, Visiting Professor of Law (Fall 1993)
Stewart J. Schwab, B.A., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Professor of Law
Robert F. Seibel, A.B., J.D., Senior Lecturer
Howard M. Shapiro, B.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Steven H. Shiffrin, B.A., M.A., J.D., Professor of Law
John A. Siiciano, B.A., M.P.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Gary J. Simson, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, B.A., J.D., Professor of Law
Joseph Straus, Diploma in Law, J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
Barry Strom, B.S., J.D., Senior Lecturer
Robert S. Summers, B.S., LL.B., William G. McRoberts Research Professor in Administration of the
Law
Winnie F. Taylor, B.A., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law
James Justesen White, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (Spring 1994)
David Wippman, B.A., M.A., J.D., Associate Professor of Law
Charles W. Wolfram, A.B., LL.B., Charles Frank Reavis Sr. Professor of Law

Faculty Emeriti
Harry Bitner, A.B., B.S., L.S., J.D., Law Librarian and Professor of Law
W. David Curtiss, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
W. Tucker Dean, A.B., J.D., M.B.A., Professor of Law
W. Ray Forrester, A.B., J.D., LL.D., Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law
Harrop A. Freeman, A.B., LL.B., J.S.D., Professor of Law
Jane L. Hammond, B.A., M.S. in L.S., J.D., Edward Cornell Law Librarian and Professor of Law
Harry G. Henn, A.B,, LL.B., J.S.D., Edward Cornell Professor of Law
Milton R. Konvitz, B.S., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Litt.D., D.C.L., L.H.D., LL.D., Professor, New York State
School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Robert S. Pasley, A.B., LL.B., Frank B. Ingersoll Professor of Law
Rudolf B. Schlesinger, LL.B., Dr. Jur., William Nelson Cromwell Professor of International and
Comparative Law
Gray Thoron, A.B., LL.B., Professor of Law
Elected Members from Other Faculties
Calum Carmichael, Professor of Comparative Literature and Biblical Studies, College of Arts and
Sciences
James A. Gross, Professor, School of Industrial and Labor Relations
Paul R. Hyams, Associate Professor of History, College of Arts and Sciences

